manipulate through misrevelation despite the existence of a single-peaked preference profile within the group.
II Formulation
A group consists of a set N = 1,2, ... ,n of members whose task is to select a single alternative from a set S = {x,y,z, ... of alternatives. The number of individuals INI in the group is assumed to be odd and the number of alternatives IS I in the alternative set is assumed to be at least three. Each individual iEN is rational: his preferences 'i are a strict order on S, i.e. Pi is a complete, asymmetric, and transitive binary relation. In the usual manner xi y means that individual i prefers that the group select alternative x instead of alternative y. Indifference between alternatives i inadmissible.1 A n-tuple p1,..." 'n) of all individuals' preferences is called a preference
profile. An individual's preferences Pi must be an element of the set of admissible preferences -. The set of admissible preference profiles is consequently Pn, the n-fold cartesian product of T. If no restriction is placed a priori on individual preferences then 7 = ir and "pn = " where 7r is the collection of all possible strict orderings on S. If some restriction is placed on individual preferences,then-7 is a proper subset of 7r. The group makes its choice among the elements of S by voting. Each individual casts a ballot Pi which is a strict order of the alternatives within S. The resulting ballot profile P = (P1,.... Pn) is inserted into the voting procedure. A voting procedure is a single valued function v(P) whose argument is the ballot profile P and whose image is a single element of S. This image is defined to be the group's choice. Thus, given a ballot profile of P, v(P) = xES is the group's choice. We assume that, for each alternative xES, an admissible ballot profile P exists such that v(P) = x.
The preference ordering Pi which an individual reveals as his ballot may or may not be an accurate statement of his true preference Pi. Any attempt through direct regulation to require him to reveal his true preferences is certain to fail because his preferences are internal to him and thus unobservable. If individual i does reveal his true preferences, then Pi -i and Pi is said to be his sincere strategy. 
If he misrepresents his true preferences, then
P3 = (y w x z). where P1 = (w x y z) mean that w P1 a, w P1 y w P1 z,xPly, etc. In this case no majority winner exists: w has a majority over x, x has a majority over y, and y has a majority over w. The Borda count assigns five points to w (three from P1, zero from P2, and two from P3), six points to x, five points to y, and two points to z. Therefore VM(P1,P2,P3) -= x.
This example also illustrates that Theorem 1 is correct in stating that majority rule with Borda completion is not strategy-proof when admissible preferences and admissible revealed preferences are unrestricted. Suppose P = (P1,P2,P3) as defined by (2) This outcome, however, is not stable despite the single-peakedness of the sincere strategy profile P -P. Individual three can manipulate the outcome by changing his ballot from P3 = P3 = (z y x w) to P3 = (y z w x). This switch creates the voting paradox among alternatives w, x, and y which, when resolved by application of the Borda count, results in alternative y being chosen, i.e. vM(P/P3) = y. Thus vM(P/P3) P3 vM(P/P3)'
and individual three can manipulate vM at the sincere strategy profile P. Note, however, that this example does not violate Theorem 2. The ordering P', while admissible as his ballot, is not admissible as his preferences because it violates the single-peakedness requirement of P. Thus the mere occurrence of a single-peaked preference profile is not sufficient to guarantee strategy-proofness. Single-peakedness of the set of admissible ballots is also required. This negative conclusion suggests a second, complementary question concerning the robustness of Theorem 2. In order to guarantee strategy-proofness is it sufficient to restrict the admissible ballot set to be single-peaked even while the admissible preference set ' is unrestricted? The answer is negative. If -is single-peaked while j" is unrestricted, then -P( p. A requirement of strategy-proofness is that " C p; therefore the voting procedure can not be strategy-proof.
This particular argument that restriction of p is insufficient to guarantee strategy-proofness is not fully satisfactory because it depends critically on the formal requirement that pC p. We can make a more satisfactory argument if we use 
V. Conclusions
If, because of the substantive nature of the alternatives, the profile of true preferences is in fact single-peaked, then the problem which K. Arrow raised with his impossibility theorem vanishes: majority rule suffices to order social elements of S into a transitive social ordering which satisfies Arrow's conditions for being an acceptable social welfare function. Unfortunately, as our examples show, the existence of a profile of single-peaked true preferences does not make the problem of manipulation vanish in like manner. This makes it difficult for a group to realize the potential for strategy-proof decisions which, as Theorem 2 shows, single-peaked preference profiles create. To achieve strategy-proofness the group must both realize that preferences are single-peaked and then, before it votes among the elements of S, agree to restrict individuals from casting ballots which are not single-peaked.
If a group considers a sequence of issues such that members' preferences over the alternatives contained within each issue are certain to be single-peaked, then the requirement for such agreement may be easily met. The group can make a single once and for all decision that requires the casting of single-peaked ballots. If, however, the sequence of issues which the group considers has more variety and preferences cannot be assumed to be single-peaked, then this becomes a very difficult requirement because a once and for all decision is inappropriate. The decision to restrict the set of admissible ballots must be made anew for each issue. But making the restriction of the admissible ballot set itself an issue is self-defeating. By voting strategically on the subsidiary question of whether to restrict or not to restrict the admissible ballot set individuals may successfully manipulate the group's final decision among the elements of S. The existence of this possibility is a prima-facie violation of the concept of strategy-proofness.
